Over at War on the Rocks, retired Air Force Colonel Mike Pietrucha takes a look at the history of light aircraft adapted for the low end of the spectrum for the attack mission:
There has been a recent flurry of press attention on OA-X, an Air Force effort to obtain off-the-shelf light attack aircraft. Sen. McCain’s recent publication of Restoring American Power — which calls for the Air Force to acquire 300 light attack aircraft — will no doubt intensify interest in the idea, with many constituencies trying to define OA-X for their own benefit and profit. Appearing to emerge out of the blue, the idea has garnered some degree of instant opposition, not all of it informed. The OA-X is already well-defined. It is the result of an effort that started nine years ago in the height of the surge in Iraq and is regaining currency as a result of the expanding use of airpower to engage violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere. Like many good ideas, it has as its genesis another successful effort from the past. Contrary to popular opinion, the Department of Defense can be remarkably good at turning to successful historical examples.
In 1966, the Air Force found itself in a conundrum. As the United States slid deeper into Southeast Asia, the Air Force’s stable of fighters was dominated by fast-moving fighters designed for high-intensity conflict with the Soviets, including an expected exchange of nuclear weapons. Aircraft like the F-101 and F-105 were optimized for the nuclear strike role but not for conventional counterland missions. Our true multirole fighter, the mighty Phantom II, was an adaptation of a Navy fleet defense fighter. The Tactical Fighter Experimental, a joint program forced on the U.S. Air Force and Navy by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MaNamara, was encountering problems in flight testing. The Navy variant would be cancelled in 1968. The Air Force was left without a modern attack capability and was forced to use a Korean-Vintage A-1 Skyraider that had been retired by the Navy.
Nine years. And not one squadron on the ramp.
What’s infuriating is that the Air Force could have been pushing on an open door in 2007 for funds to buy these planes. Essentially, the choice was between the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, and the Beechcraft AT-6C Texan II. The Boeing OV-10X restart was an outside possibility.
Seriously, while each platform had its strengths and weaknesses, any would have been an acceptable choice. Buying them in reasonable (300) numbers would have seen them begin to enter squadron service within three to four years. And having them in the inventory would lead to some nice side effects. One major benefit would be the reduced demand signal for fast jet attack aircraft such as the F-16 and F-15E Strike Eagle. That would mean the flight hours they’re currently using to fly oval racetracks over Afghanistan could instead been husbanded for training, or used in higher threat environments, such as Libya or Syria. The lowered operational tempo of having a larger force would also very likely helped stem some of the bleeding of talent the Air Force is currently struggling with.
As an added bonus, Air Force adoption of such a system would also likely increase the prospects of friendly nations buying additional aircraft, and increasing interoperability.
One suspects the Air Force was concerned that adoption of a low cost solution to 80% of its problems would have had an adverse effect on the procurement of the F-35 Lightning. We think that is unlikely. What it would have done is removed some of the pressure to concurrently develop and build the jet, which has been the source of more than a few of the issues the Lightning has faced.
Most importantly, from where I sit, the failure of the services to adopt a low cost solution is simply another manifestation of a procurement system that is so sclerotic that it simply cannot provide the force with weapon systems in anything approaching a timely manner.
See comment below, in previous post.
Paul L. Quandt
Posted by: Paul L. Quandt | 01/25/2017 at 01:38 PM
I no longer trust the Air Force to make decisions that are in America's best interest. Hard to say about my former service, but the adage about the Fighter Mafia is true. The USAF has been at the front in cheerfully adopting the Social Justice Warrior actions, happy to serve as a Test Bed for those destructive actions to our military strength. If the USAF had their way the A-10 would be history.
A detailed action plan to dissolve the USAF and fold its functions into the Army and/or the Navy would be welcome. Both the Army and the Navy also need to be taken to task also.
Posted by: ron snyder | 01/25/2017 at 02:58 PM
More culture than acquisition and procurement. Even in Air Force SOF the emphasis is on high tech, leading edge. That is, except for the 6th SOS, which I (and two colleagues) stood up in 1994. We fought for off-the-shelf tech such as the AT-6 back then but couldn't get past AFSOC and USSOCOM pig-headedness Plus USASOC thought we were trying to draw funds from the MH-47). We were accused of trying to create a "junkyard air force" and a flying club. In the end we had to lease the aircraft we got (except for a couple of old UH-1N helos en route to the bone yard). The Super-T and AT-6 would be ideal for the Marine Corps and Air Force SOF. That means it won't happen. But you are spot on, Star Baby.
Posted by: Wray Johnson | 01/25/2017 at 03:02 PM
What? The F-35 is not suitable? I am shocked!
Might I suggest the A-10 would be suitable?
Does anyone else remember the F-5?
Posted by: timactual | 01/25/2017 at 03:37 PM
The Marines will have to face the reality of this because they cannot afford to lose what few F-35B's they can purchase at a forward deployed base such as the 8 or so Harriers destroyed on the ground in Afghanistan a few years back. Bring on the OV-10s.... the brits would be smart to deploy some of them too off their new carriers i.e. Libya operation.
Posted by: Chris Green | 01/25/2017 at 08:08 PM
In any conflict, no matter how hard you try to protect your assets, there will be losses. Where do the replacements come from and how much does they cost? More and cheaper pickup trucks have better options than expensive, complicated, multi faceted Ferraris. The Pentagon has all the lessons learned in files on old airframes that were successful in their day. I keep thinking about the old A-4, light, relatively inexpensive but effective. Or the OV-10, as mentioned. Build them, trick them out with todays cheaper tech and put them in play. You can still do all the countermeasures to protect them. Take as few losses as possible, but get all the benefits utilizing the volume of assets from off the shelf, tried and true players.
But NewThink is drones, so the discussions are specious.
Posted by: Gordo | 01/26/2017 at 07:40 AM
I would echo the lack of diverse acft. Specialty aircraft kept the air force agile. From the mud to heaven. Not any more. Shucks, even the airshows are getting lame. Only so many times for thunder, it's getting where the car has a better performance. And I like watching them. Always wondered why they never mention the old t-38, updated, better engines, that would be neat.
Posted by: Jim | 01/27/2017 at 06:44 AM
Durn Google, CAF!
Posted by: Jim | 01/27/2017 at 06:46 AM
Desert Air Force.
Cab rank system.
Not new...
Posted by: Mad Marsupial | 01/27/2017 at 12:59 PM
The A-4 had many fine points, but it wasn't all that. If I recall, it only ever had iron sights as part of Ed Heinemann's "keep it simple" philosophy. Not a good choice.
I must yet again remind folks that simple & cheap isn't always better. The B-18 Bolo was simple & cheap compared to the B-17 (the former was nearly half the cost of the latter) but it turned out to be militarily useless.
Mustangs & Thunderbolts were were cheaper & simpler than F-4s or F-8s, and were very effective for their era, but no one to my knowledge ever suggested re-starting the F-51 or P-47 line.
The A-4 is in a similar situation. It was a great plane for the 1950s and 1960s, but we're well into the second decade of the 21st century. It's time to let go. :)
To a certain extent, the nostalgia, while pleasant, is a waste of time. The real lesson lies in Brad's rant about how long it took to buy a freaking pistol.
If DoD let strategy dictate acquisition, we would have (as someone else observed) a whole fleet of Super Tucanos or Texan IIs a long time ago.
Posted by: Casey | 01/27/2017 at 06:17 PM
The A-29, AT-6 and the OV-10 all should be able to take-off and land on the Navy's helicopter carriers without the need for arresting wires and catapults.
If they did need to use a catapult for full load launches a modified and updated WW-2 Type P-Mk 6 catapult should work.
That catapult launched thousands of aircraft and worked as intended.
Posted by: jon spencer | 01/27/2017 at 06:18 PM
If a fully-loaded '60s-vintage C-130 could safely land AND take off from CV-59 USS Forrestal without wires or catapults, a Tucano or a new-build max OV-10 could do it easily on a Gator Freighter.
I'd love to see what a C-130J could do on a Nimitz.
Posted by: Captain Ned | 01/28/2017 at 08:15 AM
Once more, with feeling: P47 with a full load of SDBs and .50 cal.
Army aviation. Each corps gets a squadron as an asset they can push down to provide direct support to BCTs in low-intensity environments. Have them operable as 2- or 4-ship sections, or deploy as the entire squadron for GS theater support.
Posted by: Esli | 01/29/2017 at 03:39 PM
Just bring back the Army Air Corps and get rid of the USAF.
Posted by: Quartermaster | 01/30/2017 at 09:59 AM